



by E. P. Thompson
LECTURE 1. THE THREAT OF WAR
ITIS A very great privilege and a very great honour to be asked to
deliver the first of your Bertrand Russell Peace Lectures, and I con-
gratulate the University on its initiative, on its extremely careful and
expert handling of the Russell Archives, and on its initiative in forming
the President's Committee on the Study of Peace. I cannot claim any
direct association with Bertrand Russell, apart from attending meetings
which he addressed. I think I may have once sat down in Whitehall or
Trafalgar Square along with Bertrand Russell, but there were a good
many thousands of us doing it, and when you get to these things, the
recollections of us old codgers are really very unreliable. I have an indi-
rect association with Russell in the sense that when the European
Nuclear Disarmament "Appeal'" was drafted (which I myself did) and
then revised by many hands and issued over many thousands of sig-
natures, mainly European, but also North American, in early 1980, this
was done under the organizing auspices of the Bertrand Russell Peace
Foundation, which also was the publisher of my pamphlet Protest and
Survive. Indeed, the END "Appeal" is still known in many parts of
Europe as the "Russell Appeal".
Are we now simply doing no more than rephrase what Russell was
saying thirty years ago? This morning I was privileged to look into the
Archives, and I selected a file concerning the formation of the Pugwash
Conferences. From this leapt out a paper in which Russell was writing:
I "Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament", in E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith,
eds., Protest and Survive (Harmondsworth, Mddx.: Penguin Books, 1980); rev. ed.
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981).
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It is difficult for me to find words with which to express the depth of my
outrage at the obscenity of our creative efforts being employed for purposes
of global butchery.... They have covered our planet with rocket bases, and
have placed these bases on a hair trigger. The radar which they employ is
incapable of distin~shing a goose from a Senator.... I, for one, am not
prepared to place the fate of human civilization in the hands of semi-literate
paranoids.>
Sadly, the discussions in these papers in 195.5 to 1957 turned upon the
outrageously radical proposal to ban· the testmg of all nuclear weapons,
and now thirty years on, public opinion throughout the world is still
deman~g this. The leaders of the non-aligned states have written to
Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan making an identical demand, and
yet the rocket-bases that Russell referred to have multiplied.
Russell was an absolutist. He was, if you like, an abolitionist. And
absolutism and abolitionism have not yet worked. Through all the local
politics of our work, he was concerned, as we still are, with the raising
ofconsciousness. We're told often by critics who are cautious adherents
of deterrence that deterrence after all has "worked". There may be, at
some times and on some occasions, historical validation for that argu-
ment. But less often mentioned is the other half of the reason that
nuclear weapons have not been used-which is, at each moment when
the statesmen of the world have considered the possibility of using it,
they face the knowledge that this would outrage opinion in every part
of the world, and that the true deterrence against the use of "the deter-
rent" has been precisely the alert state of public opinion. Therefore,
in this sense, the peace movement has to be renewed again and again
as the only true deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. Russell
said in 1957 that nuclear war was a matter of statistical near-certainty.
Notwithstanding which, for thirty years, this statistical juncture has not
yet been reached. Yet I would echo this:· I feel that unless some dra-
matic resolution of the world's predicament is found, it is scarcely likely
that that statistical juncture will not be reached in the next thirty years.
When I called these two lectures together "From Protest to Sur-
vival", please understand I did not mean to imply that protest is no
longer needed. I also did not mean to imply that protest had been a
futile activity and had achieved nothing. It has had this effect: the
world-wide movements of the last five years may not yet have succeeded
in achieving any diminution in the mounting nuclear arms of both
sides, but it has made for a watching presence surrounding the actions
2 "Statement for Future Use by S.O.S." (RA 625, Printed Material), p. I.
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of all nuclear-owning statesmen and states. The superpowers today are
acting out their diplomatic drama before an alert audience throughout
the world. This is world opinion. The other achievement of the last five
years has been the way in· which peace movements have found each
other out, and there has been a regeneration of internationalism. Yet
if we are to move from protest to survival we must address, not only
the question of weapons, but the political conditions preparing World
War III. I'm notgoing to waste your time persuading you that nuclear
weapons are ugly. I want to follow a different course in these two lec-
tures. In this one I want to examine some of the causes of war in general
and of World War III in particular. .
Let us commence, since I am a historian, with a view of this question
of war from a historical perspective. There are very few generalizations
which would be universally assented to about warfare, and those that
would be are commonplaces. First, war is normal. It punctuates the
written historical record as commas, colons, and periods punctuate a
page. Warfare has established markers between clans, tribes, peoples,
city-states, nation-states, markers of territory, tribute, prestige, hege-
mony, empire. We can't prescribe that warfare is dysfunctional, a sort
of short-circuit in the social system, an abnormality. On the contrary,
the characteristic social formation of modern times, the nation-state,
was formed in war, and the state assumes the preparation and per-
formance of war a~ a major activity. And this has had profound effects
upon the character of society and economy, the hierarchy of authority,
the modus of taxation, internal security, war, information control, the
legitimation of authority. Take war, take the threat of war away, and
there would follow far-reaching consequences in domestic organization.
There is nothing in the historical record, nothing in the record of the
twentieth century, to give grounds for optimism that warfare between
states is coming to its historical term.
Indeed, for this to happen, the nature of the most powerful states
would have to change first. And the available evidence goes in the other
direction. It's the very normality of war that is the strongest argument
on the side of those who uphold the virtues of nuclear deterrence. Is
it likely that a major activity of organized soc;iety since records began-
and the earliest records, the epics and sagas, the first great histories,
Thucydides, Szuma Chien, are records of rulers and warfare-should
abruptly cease in 1986 because liberal thinkers dislike it? It's not. And,
therefore, it's argued that the only inhibitor strong enough to repress
an activity endemic to the human record must be the realization that,
in nuclear times, war can only conclude for all parties in a terminal
spasm. This is a strong argument. Russell and many others have offered
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reasons to show that the theory of deterrence lacks historical realism
and is flawed. But we shouldn't pucker up our noses at it, as if it was
only a bad moral smell. It is an argument which persons who pro-
foundly desire peace can honestly hold.
The second commonplace is that warfare is not a natural form of
behaviour, it is highly artificial. Put in the simplest way, no "bare-
forked creature" or natural unsocialized man could endure for a
. moment the artificial violence of a battlefield. I myself have seen in the
final battle of Cassino dogs flee in terror from the field, donkeys hurl
themselves into hedges, and birds, dazed by the gunfire, fly into walls
and trees like moths into a lighted window. You may point out that it
wasn't their battle, they were innocent neutrals. Yet among the human
combatants, the shell-shocked or the bomb-happy, sobbing and shiv-
ering in holes or under blankets, were those who reverted to what you
might call "natural" reflexes of self-preservation. Whereas the most
battle-hardened and disciplined troops, such as the German elite forces
surviving in the pulverized rubble of Cassino town-that is, those who
were most socialized in the artifice of war-were those who endured as
effective fighting units.
Perhaps some in the generation which has happily not experienced
war have formed an abstract and moralistic notion of the phenomenon.
In supposing warfare to be unnatural, they may suppose it to be pos-
sible to end it by some moral enlightenment of our fellows. I share their
antipathy, yet we will not end it unless we understand it as it is, as
highly civilized conduct which today commands the most advanced
technologies, the most task-specific socialization and the most elabo-
rately structured organizations ever known.
Warfare is not a reversion by masses to a more primitive level of
aggression of human nature. The violence of war is not interpersonal
but interstate, and in modern warfare very little fighting is face to face.
There's nothing personal about modern warfare. The MX and the SS-
20 have no faces. And there was in World War I and World War II
more "aggro" in the popular press at home than among the combatant
forces.
Warfare doesn't so much legitimate violence as enforce violent
behaviour in organized and even ritualized forms against designated
targets or enemies. The rules of war are usually thought of as those
limited conventions which prescribe, for example, how prisoners of war
shall be treated. But one can quickly discern more imperative, if some-
times invisible, unwritten rules which govern this form of civilized con-
duct. The rules lie half hidden within everyday terminology, whose
very aim is to depersonalize the engagement. "Target", "objective",
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"mission", or in today's sanitized, acronymic vocabulary, "take out",
"counterforce", or "NUTS". .
I slipped, you may have noticed, in describing the outlawing of the
taking of human life as a civilized taboo. That was an improper nor-
mative intrusion. For the artificial rules of war have an equal claim to
being artifacts of civilization. (If Rambo had been under military orders
he would have been a very cultured man, a very "parfait gentle
knight".) Unless we understand that war is an elaborated code and
discipline of civilized conduct, we can't bring our disciplines to bear
on it. Those, like absolute pacifists, who reject this conduct usually
place themselves in opposition to the state and to authorized notions
of civil society. What warfare doesn't need is a surplus of undirected
aggression. (Rambo will never get to being a general.) Maybe warfare
never did. Even the object of the ferocious Aztec warriors was not
immediate bloodshed but the capture of prisoners for ritual sacrifice.
And for this object they were elaborately motivated and trained from
the moment of birth. Today's wars require calm under fire, precision
and, within prescribed parameters, initiative. The disciplined aggro of
the military combatant is light-years away from the more spontaneous
aggressions of civil life. ___
Now these negative commonplaces enable us to set on one side the
pursuit of universal explanations as to the cause of, war, explanations
which arise with great persistence. One such universal is the suggestion
that human nature is somehow programmed as warlike, hence war must
be ineradicable. This is either a truism, for everything that has ever
happened at any time in history or prehistory must perforce belong to
the possibilities of human nature, or a pessimistic cop-out. We should
recall that warfare's programming lies not in nature but in nurture, that
it is an elaborate function of civilized states, that within those societies
human aggression has been so reprogrammed by socialization, by edu-
cation, by institutions, that sanctions against violence normally operate
with fair success inside the nation-state. And that therefore our inquiry
should be directed not towards some suppositious biological archetype,
but towards the behaviour of states.
This universal has regained currency today in the modified propo-
sition that the ultimate cause of war is to be found in masculine human
nature, that warfare is a function of male aggression. This view is held,
with greater or less sophistication, by a good many of my fellow peace-
campaigners of both genders in Europe. Since I respect them and their
actions, I must attend to their views with respect. Yet in my alternative
identity as a social historian, I find the proposition only a little less
unconvincing than the truism about all human nature. If taken literally,
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it is scarcely less pessimistic, since it would suggest' that the human
record could only have been reformed by writing one gender out of it-
a counterfactual proposition of the kInd that makes historians impa-
tient-and that the necessary precondition for world peace must be
either the elimination from public life of one gender, or the redirection
of its instinctual aggressive drives by some miraculous conversion.
Now this proposition has value as a spur to inquiry if we turn it
. around, if we reformulate it in terms of consequence rather than cause.
Modern warfare has normally been pursued through gender segrega-
tion. ~his doesn't, by the way, mean that the men have been warlike
while the women have been peacemakers. It's usually meant the seg-
regation into distinct roles, both of which have been war-directed, in
so far as the state could ensure. But the combatant role of men has
strengthened male authority in some privileged political roles and priv-
ileged social areas. The most militarized societies have often been those
with the strongest, male-dominated hierarchies of authority and sup-
posedly masculine inflections of value-of honour, valour, macho or,
today, male-dominated technology with its phallic emblems of guns and
missiles. War-directed states reinforce already existent masculine-dom-
inative modes. Or rather, they reward and honour the macho and the
aggressive male propensities, and they devalue the peaceable, the nur-
turing, and creative propensities of unaggressive men. What they seek
to do is to impose a military definition as to what is "manhood"-a
definition, one should say, that's often, in history, approved also within
the feminine culture, and is even rewarded in. the admiring mirror of
the women's sexual favours in times of war.
Gender segregation of roles within a war-directed state has very
rarely taken the form of militarist versus pacific tendencies but may be
seen more in terms of cultural antiphony or reciprocity, Most military
states have fostered strongly supportive feminine cultures, endorsing
and furthering military and imperial values. And this can be read
through in the high history of European imperialisms, British impe-
rialism, the role of the officer's wife, the female community in the
Indian Raj or in the history of Nazism, and so on. You find this attempt
to engender these two reciprocal cultures. Indeed the incapacity to take
the role of combatant has sometimes been seen as the crowning indign-
ity of gender discrimination. "Oh if the Queen were a man," Queen
Victoria wrote to her Prime Minister, Disraeli, during the Eastern
Question crisis of the late 1870s, "she would like to go and give those
Russians such a beating. We shall never be friends again until we have
it out!"
Yet it remains true that male military elites grow fat on war like
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succubae. In consequence, the dominance, not of males but that kind
of approved male character-type, is extended forward into times of
peace. It's also true-and much is written valuably about this now-
that there has been a small space within feminine culture which has
protected alternative symbols of nurture and of survival. These symbols
are a resource upon which today's peace movements rightly draw. And
it's a proper concern of our disciplines to explore the gender-inflected
resources of alternative peaceable paradigms.
There are other, more local generalizations offered as universals for
our own times, which bear up less well and which I think less pro-
ductive. It was thought by the enlightened in the eighteenth century
that all wars were caused by princes, and it was widely argued after
World War 1that modern wars were caused by military elites and ruling
classes indifferent to the pacific dispositions of the peoples. Alack, it
has turned out that war in times of domestic tension can play to rap-
turous full houses. Nazi and Fascist parties found ways to seize power,
sometimes displacing traditional ruling groups, by raising to near hys-
teria the long-inculcated nationalist dispositions of a part of the public,
including many unemployed youth, who would be the first to go the
front. We sensed for a few weeks the stirring of this hysteria in Britain
during the Falklands War, just as you may have noted it across.the
border during the Iranian hostage crisis or at the time of Grenada.
Then it was supposed quite widely that the cause of modern war was
capitalism tout court. But alack once more, we've discovered that states
which style themselves as socialist have not concurred in this analysis.
They have proved to be quite capable of engaging in postures and acts
of war, not only with capitalist, or pre-capitalist states, but also with
their own categorical kin. The extraordinary warrening of the cities of
China with tunnels during Mao's last years testify to the fact that one
socialist state supposed that a nuclear attack upon it by another was
not categorically incredible.
More favoured today as a generalization of a universal for our times,
and for the foreseeable future (until that future ends), is that warfare
is grounded not in human nature but in the very nature of the nation-
state. War, or the preparation of war, is the very condition of its exist-
ence, whether the state be capitalist or communist. This underpins the
argument of sober advocates of deterrence. It's more descriptive than
analytical in its force, which may be why it's favoured by empirically
minded British academics like Professor Michael Howard, who con-
cludes in The Causes of Wars that war is inherent in the very structure
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of the state. 3 The causes of war, he continues, remain rooted in per-
ceptions by statesmen of the growth of hostile power and the fears for
the restriction, if not the extinction, of their own. The fears and per-
ceptions of statesmen should be seen, he argues, as being within their
own terms rational, and wars begin with the conscious and reasoned
decision, based on the calculation made by both parties, that they can
achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace, even if the
outcome of war falsifies those expectations. Indeed, the institution of
the nation-state predicates a tendency towards warfare since the cen-
tripetal forces which make for national cohesion are liable to generate
centrifugal nationalist pressures towards other states. In Howard's
words, "Self-identification as a nation implies, almost by definition,
alienation from other communities." We are now in an area which cer-
tainly does merit investigation, yet does Professor Howard finally per-
suade us? Many of his examples are drawn from nineteenth-century
inter-European warfare-the British, French, Germans, Russians, the
Austro-Hapsburg Empire. If World War 1 was based on rational and
calculated acts, then it was a spectacular miscalculation by all parties,
whose causes, in turn, leave something to be explained. As analysis,
this scarcely has a vocabulary for European wars of conquest against
weaker peoples in Asia and Africa, nor does it diagnose the cultural
traumas of a surfeited and also stifled imperialism in Europe itself. I
should say one side surfeited, like Britain, France, Portugal; one side
stifled, like Germany. Nor, in my view, can a vocabulary of rationality
and calculation begin to measure the exalted Nazi economy and culture
of aggression which led to World War II.
What seems to rise from around the edges of Howard's display of
unsentimental realism is a miasma of unexplained motivations excluded
from his vocabulary. For the causes of war are rooted, we remember,
less in the structure of the states than in the perceptions and fears of
statesmen, and there's plenty of room for emotional and ideological
forces to get in among those roots. Ifwe speak of calculation and ration-
ality, we are speaking of proximate causes and not ulterior ones, and
of rationality within the self-estimation of statesmen socialized within
a given culture-power, with its sanctioned reasons of state. These rea-
sons are very much those which that eminent authority in strategic
studies, Gulliver, once explained so patiently to his Houyhnhnm
master:
1 Howard, The Causes ofWar and Other Essays, 2nd ed. (London: Temple Smith, 1983;
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard D.P., 1984), p. 12.
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Sometimes one prince quarrelleth with another, for fear the other should
quarrel with him. Sometimes a war is entered upon, because the enemy is
too strong, and sometimes because he is too weak. Sometimes our neighbours
want the things which we have, or have the things which we want.... If a
prince send forces into a nation, where the people are poor and ignorant, he
may lawfully put half of them to death, and make slaves of the rest in order
to civilize and reduce them from their barbarous way of living.... For these
reasons, the trade of a soldier is held the most honourable of all others:
because a soldier is a Yahoo hired to kill in cold blood as many of his own
species, who have never offended him, as possibly he can.
Yet his master, when listening to Gulliver's self-congratulatory cata-
logue of these means of reason-"cannons, culverins, muskets, cara-
bines, pistols, bullets, powder, swords, bayonets, battles, sieges,
retreats, attacks, undermines, countermines, bombardments, sea-
fights; ships sunk with a thousand men; 20,000 killed on each side;
dying groans, limbs flying in the air, smoke, noise, confusion, tram-
pling to death under horses' feet: flight, pursuit, victory: fields strewed
with carcases left for food to dogs, and wolves, and birds of prey; plun-
dering, stripping, ravishing, burning and destroying" (very elementary
and unmodernized means of reason in those days)-his master could
only neigh in abhorrence when a creature pretending to reason could
be capable of such enormities. He dreaded lest the corruption of that
faculty might be worse than brutality itself.
This is a dilemma of our own discourse. Is Professor Howard
describing rational acts, or the corruption of reason? From a
Houyhnhnm perspective of rationality, all war is brutish and irrational,
as that Houyhnhnm, William Blake, saw it, "The soldier arm'd with
Sword & Gun/Palsied strikes the summer's sun." Yet given the real
historical context of nation-states, the immediate causes of war have
sometimes appeared to be so rational as to compel the assent of all but
the absolute pacifists. To say that all war has been irrational, is to refuse
also the role and central values of all nation-states, including those
which achieved their independence through war or liberation struggles,
and it is to conclude, as I can't conclude, that nothing of significance
has ever been decided by war. I'm a nuclear pacifist, but I remain an
unrepentant veteran of World War II. Our problem today is to engineer
a gradient to carry civilization from its yahoo past and its yahoo present
to a houyhnhnm future.
One other universal for our time requires close attention: the view
that wars were caused by the arms manufacturers-Krupps, Thyssen,
Vickers-Armstrong and others-and are now prepared by the even
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more formidable military-industrial-academic complex. This is not, of
course, proposed as a historical universal. It's not suggested that in
ancient times wars were caused by those who had a corner in flint
arrowheads or by the Guild of Fletchers and Bowyers. It's a statement
about the nature of advanced industrial societies, the changing balance
of interest groups within them, their influence on political life and pub-
lic opinion. It comes directly within the purview of academic disciplines
represented in this university.
We can certainly discern a plausible causative factor here. Let me
give you a very blunt example. The independent United States Council
for Economic Priorities has recently pointed out that the major bene-
ficiaries of prime contracts for Star Wars research are also the great
contractors, such as Rockwell International, Boeing, Lockheed,
AVCO, T.R.W., L.T.V., Litton, Martin Marietta, who are the major
beneficiaries under state tender for the current round of modernization
of United States' nuclear weaponry. The same giants contracted the
MX, the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles, the Pershing II and the Trident
DS. To make modern weaponry requires longer lead times than to
make jeans or automobiles. Hence the contractors must show presci-
ence in looking for forward markets. They may indeed need to man-
ufacture the market itself, that is, the future demand which they can
then prepare to supply. And this is a big mouthful to chew over. What
one's saying is that when current orders for the MX and the B~lare
fulfilled, which will be in the very early 'nineties, the order-books will
be half empty.
But while forward research will continue among those whom Lord
Zuckerman once called "the alchemists of the laboratories" , so long as
Federal funding can be found, the forward market is insecure for the
neat new modernizations which they offer. This is for political, not for
technological or economic, reasons. The public is jaded. Even the
United States Congress is becoming awkward, as it was over the MX
missile. I've been told that shortly before President Reagan launched
the Star Wars speech in March 1983, he had a meeting with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who said, "Look, we've got to find another way." (I
wasn't there, so I can't give the exact words.) "We've got to find
anotherway. Congress is no longer going to buy endless more upward
modernization. There's this terrible Freeze movement. We have to sell
the product in some other way."
Thus it is becoming more and more difficult to sell each new, brave
invention. Futures are becoming unstable-not futures of the people,
please understand, which have been hideously unstable for decades,
but the future of making excess profits from guaranteed. markets for
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the next 50 ,000 warheads to be set on top of the existing 50,000. It is
not only the rising profile of peace movements but even a sort of dif-
fused "ah-shucksism" amongst the electorate that's making the cause
of the endless modernization and multiplication of nukes unpopular.
So the giants have been set this problem-to fill the order-books in
1995 they must create a market in 1985. But there can no longer be
just a market for new models of the same product. I mean they can't
just do it by adjusting the windscreens and the internal heating, and
adding new bumper-bars to the nukes. They must imagine a new prod-
uct, and. they must bully the state into funding its research ten years
before it has even been invented. This really is a colossal problem and
a new one even in the innovative history of American capitalism.
Because the market, or the demand, has to be inside people's heads
urgently, now, in advance of the product. The market is a certain state
of political anxiety. The demand must arise from the fear of the enemy
and the expectation that the threat is growing worse. So to market the
product in 1995, you have to have people absolutely terrified about the
Russians in 1985.
Please note that we have now got outside the normal demarcations
of economic discipline. The laws Of supply and demand are going cross-
eyed. Politics, or a political psycho-drama, must now provide the lead
time for material production. The crazy superstructure of hypotheses
must tower above the infrastructure. We have to persuade the public
to imagine "it" before we can "fix it". Above all, it is necessary that
the public should imagine that the threat of war must be very much
worse in ten or fifteen years' time, in order to terrify the taxpayer today
into meeting that future expectation, with the means to ensure that his
worst fears are inexorably brought about.
Well, they did it. The answer was Star Wars. The military assault
on space justified the strategy of anti-nuclear defence. Not just a new
model but a quite new product promises to fill the order-books until
the 1990S and beyond. It's a simple question of corporate foresight. It
can be shown that certain of the giants had this prescience, that they
and the alchemists of the Lawrence Livermore and the Los Alamos
laboratories, together with selected political interest groups deeply
experienced in lobbying on the Hill, with close links with Pentagon
personnel, have engineered the lift-off into Star Wars. God knows what
these billions of dollars of researchers may discover, although it will
not be a leak-proof Astrodome over the US of A. Most probably it will
be neat new instruments of lethality, such as death-rays in several
forms, which will be found by subsequent generations of politicians
and military to have even neater uses on the ground than those of zap-
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ping elusive missiles in space. But what matter? Certain zones of Cal-
ifornia, Arizona, Washington and Texas will have been kept in a
permanent state of affluent economic erection.
The Strategic Defence Initiative may never shoot down a single mis-
sile, but it is already proving to be a success in shooting down any hope
of agreement between the superpowers for disarmament. Yet the limits
of this explanation also have to be noted. War is normally between two
parties. NATO's military-industrial complex does not confront, in this
respect, a symmetrical antagonist. There's certainly a formidable mil-
itary-industrial complex in the Soviet Union which is bringing forward
its own ASATs, particle-beams and the rest. But the Soviet complex's
mode of operation and its goals are different from those of private cap-
ital. Ideology and bureaucratic interest perform in the USSR the role
of hungering order-books ahead. So we have identified a unilateral
cause of the dynamics of the arms race in the United States-giant
space contractors-but not the final cause of the next war, unless we
are to say that the arms race itself is the cause.
Moreover, to state that the military-industrial complex can prescribe
courses which have profound political, diplomatic, economic and social
consequences-perhaps even terminal consequences for the host soci-
ety-is to make a very large proposition about society in general. It's
to say that one federally subsidized growth sector of the United States'
economy, with its allies and agents, has been able to capture the state
itself, and, in doing so, it has pushed aside all other interests-farming,
civil transportation, civil construction, most manufacturing, much
finance, service industries, education, health, what have you-in order
to engage in a gigantic rip-off which brings all citizens into danger. It's
to say that American society, as a whole, is subordinated to this com-
plex, in terms of power and economic priorities, which like a giant fly-
wheel drives the whole machine, including the President and the Con-
gress, through their rotations.
If the proposition be shown true, if the military-industrial complex
has now displaced the American political process, it still doesn't follow
that it will have an easy ride. Apart from the fact that the public one
day might cease to be indifferent, and might ask questions about the
rip-off, there is another difficulty. For there is another old model
pushed along the rhetorical road, with suppositious historical warranty
but with no engine under the bonnet, which is that the nations always
victorious in war are those with the most advanced technological devel-
opment. As a matter of common knowledge, this model crashed in the
paddy fields of Vietnam, and ought never to have been revived. There
are fascinating equations between technology, warfare and society. But
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these are very rarely simple equations. It's been argued that the pow-
erful and deadly ancient Chinese crosshow inhibited the full develop-
ment of slavery in China, since any slaves who got hold of it could shoot
through the lightly padded armour of their masters. Obviously the
musket and rifle's firepower was decisive against the native American
peoples on this continent. A similar story can be read in a thousand
encounters between small European contingents and numerous but ill-
armed forces in India and Africa. ("Whatever happens we have got!
The Maxim gun which they have not.") But the fall of the Roman
Empire, despite its best endeavours, before hard-living, well-horsed
barbarians is an example on the other side, and there are plenty of other
examples. The defect of advanced military technology is to overarm,
while those within the galleons or the missile silos grow soft on fine
wines or pot. This overarming has been described in our times as the
"baroque arsenal", although "rococo" might express it better. The
tendency to develop ever more elaborate, all-singing, all-dancing, all-
praying machines at inconceivable costs which can fail at the drop of
a microchip: in this perspective, the strategic defence initiative is the
rococo epiphany. There can be no doubt that it's a commie plot some-
how smuggled into the White House by way of Livermore Laboratory,
whose true object is to collapse the United States' economy.
The central problem requiring our examination, in my view, is that
of national identity or self-image, as it is defined in relation to the
enemy-Other. This takes us back to Michael Howard's valid observa-
tion, "Self-identification of a nation implies, almost by definition, alien-
ation from other communities." This is something more than national
self-image versus enemy image. It proposes that every nation needs an
enemy, or an idea of one, to bind itself together in its own identity.
To that degree "the Other" is a projection of its own need. When I
follow this argment through-please don't think that I'm not saying
that there are no real clashes of interest, no real clashes of ideology-
I am following a different line of examination, which I hope you'll find
is valid. If groups need out-groups, if herds need scapegoats, if con-
formists need delinquents to beat the boundaries of norms and ident-
ities, then nations need "the Other" most of all, and they need it
especially when their own self-identity is blurred or insecure, or when
they fear internal disturbance. The question then is, must "the Other"
perforce be the enemy? Must this always enforce the reasons of the
yahoo? This is the question at the close of the twentieth century. While
a hundred nationalisms now appear to grow in rancour, it's a question
which must be posed with particular urgency now to American and to
Soviet reality. In the bipolar confrontation, which makes captive the
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entire globe, is there something other than conflicts of interest and of
ideologies which perpetuates this confrontation? Is there some special
need for each nation to have each other as the enemy today, for reasons
of internal bonding and self-identity?
There's strong reason to suppose that this is so in the case of the
Soviet Union, at least in the eyes of those who regard it from outside
its own ideological self-closure. It is a huge, ramshackle quasi-empire,
the last of the nineteenth-century empires to go, with many national
and ethnic components, overripe for modernization and democratiza-
tion, attempting to escape from the stultifying, centralized controls of
Stalinism and post-Stalinism, with an apathetic labour force, with an
increasingly restive periphery of unhappy allies. How can its rulers
bond its citizenry, hold their client-states together, exert internal social
discipline and isolate dissident elements; unless by gesticulating con-
tinually at the threat of the Western Imperialist Other, which menaces
(as historical memories of earlier invasions confirm) the citizenry
bonded together in their own self-image as the first and foremost social-
ist state, which ideologically prefigures a universal socialist future?
Apart from any external attempts to destabilize the regime-and such
attempts are made-there are internal, self-generating forces of des-
tabilization. If the physical and mental frontiers of the Soviet Union
were to be overnight thrown open to the world, it's doubtful whether
the social system could survive the apparent contrast between the
Soviet deprivation and western affluence. Hence even the cautious
modernizers in the Soviet bureaucracy still require the Other, and Mr.
Reagan's USA which has been doing its very best to look like a plau-
sible threat, has provided the necessary bonding which prevents the
Soviet bloc from undergoing any rapid diversification, democratization
and change. Not the Soviet people but the Soviet military, and the old
post-Stalinist guard, need the Other very much.
But what about America? Here's another super-state, also too big for
its own good, an ethnic miscellany assembled from the four corners of
the globe. What provides bonding for this miscellany, what gives to
Americans their special self-image and sense of national identity?
There's much fine historical self-examination of American identity, but
most of it is pursued introversially, as must be the case from within.
Was essential Americanism the pursuit of freedom, opportunity and
mobility, the newness of the new world, the frontier experience (both
geographic and psychological), the melting-pot, the affront of the par-
adox of slavery, the tenacious coexistence of diverse ethnic traditions?
Yes, it was something of all those things; but what was outside the fron-
tier, what was looking in and threatening without? If these qualities
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were to be American, what was the not-American, or the un-American,
what was the role of the Other in forming American self-identity?
The late Warren Susman in his Culture as History discussed the ques-
tion as to why socialism so often appears in America as a foreign ide-
ology and commented, "One of the many paradoxes of American
history is how a nation of immigrants could be at the same time a nation
that could be so often roused to fear and even hysteria over ideas, move-
ments, and people labelled foreign .... "4 This may be paradox, yet it
also is precisely the logic of bonding within a miscellaneous immigrant
population that there is an even greater need of the fear of otherness
to bond against. The equally paradoxical phenomenon of American
psychic national insecurity has often been noted. It appears as absurd,
a nation with so much going for it, with so little external threat, with
so many achievements, such manifest growing power. Yet the new
world was also a world many of whose people were displaced persons,
and to meet their insecurity, unusual efforts, both consciously crafted
and through less conscious forms of compensation, were made to con-
struct an artificial identity of what it was to be American.
Moreover this self-image-making didn't happen only once in the
1870S and '80S, it became obsessional within American culture. It went
on and on and on, and it continues todaY, in ways it seems to outsiders
to be narcissistic, when commercialism and ideology conspire to pro-
duce each year a new model of the all-American idea, with new
bumper-bars and everything: a truly fearsome, Disney-like confection,
always young, sanitized, competitive, achievement-orientated, the
utterly self-righteous guardian of every value known to time, conflict-
free and completely characterless, and in no way like the warty and
incredibly various Americans whom we outsiders know, often admire,
and even love.
As Susman noted, the search for the real America could become a
new kind of nationalism. The idea of an American way could reinforce
conformity (it could indeed) but always in the pretence that it was not
nationalism at all of the Old World kind, as indeed it was not, but was
a denationalized universal, the "human future". Identity required. a
sort of national super-ego constructed as much from ideology, the id~a
of Americanism, as from history and contingency.
This ideology grew not in response to external, armed threats but
out of the needs of domestic discipline. "The Other" was not yet an
enemy-Other of European type, fully fleshed out with ethnic or racist
4 Susman, Culture as Hisuny: the Transfurmation of American Society in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 77.
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chauvinism common to other nationalisms, although, as America's
frontier extended into a world-wide dominion of interests and alliances,
the palpable abrasion with others gave to it some of these tones. This
was most true of the Pacific frontier where the alien began to have an
Asian colour. Yet it remained possible until well into the twentieth
century to suppose that Americanism was not a true nationalism at all,
but was the universal, multinational human future. When the frontier
was finally reached early in the twentieth century, there was that unique
formation of nationalism, isolationism, which closed the door in self-
sufficiency against the world. Pearl Harbour broke that overnight, leav-
ing its own historical legacy imprinted in the American mind, with its
fear of "windows of vulnerability", just the imprinting of the Nazi
invasion of 1941 is there in the collective Soviet memory.
In World War II, the United States entered deeply into the world
and took over the "white man's burden" lapsing from tired European
hands in many parts of the world: in Greece, Iran and the Middle East.
At that point the Soviet Union and Chinese Communism provided the
perfect foil, the perfect Other, their totalitarian features the foil to the
idea of freedom, just as the vigorous capitalism of the United States
was the foil to the Soviet vision of socialist universalism. The execution
of the Rosenbergs, the witch-hunting of the Un-American Committee,
marked the entry into a period which, with modifications, we still
inhabit. When the Sputnik bleeped its way over the United States, it
engendered near-hysteria-war had always in this century been "over
there". For the first time it was possible to envisage an enemy-Other
that could reach the sacred soil itself.
From this time onwards, in a locked combat with the Soviet Union,
the United States leaped into a new stage of nationalism. The full asser-
tion of American nationalism was the more brash and self-congratu-
latory, in that it had been so long in waiting for its historical moment.
In our own time, with the brief interval for the Chinese, Soviet Com-
munism has fulfilled the needs for domestic bonding superbly, and has
repaid in full measure the debt which the Soviet rulers owe to American
"imperialism" for performing the same function for them. I place
"imperialism" in inverted commas, since I consider that the problem
of the United States in the world today stems from nationalist forces
and ideological mystifications, deliberately incited in populist ways by
interested parties, and not from imperialism in the old sense, although
there is also plenty of that. The approved self-image, the state-author-
ized identity of an American national today, is to be a super-national
of a state which arrogates to itself a divine right to go any place and
bust in at any door in the name of its leadership of the "Free World",
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which has fallen into many good old British habits in assuming the
burden of bringing light to "the lesser breeds without the law", and
which is locked in messianic combat with the communist Other whose
ways and wiles are sufficiently defined when they are known as "un-
American" .
Now this sketch of one artificially confected idea of American nation-
alism has been a brutal child's cartoon. I've lampooned the aggressive
character of this idea. I've said nothing of its real domestic substance,
the unusual capacity for assimilation of strangers and aliens within
American social life. I've said nothing of powerful, alternative, inter-
nationalist traditions, to which the whole world owes a debt, particu-
larly in terms of information. But I consider that this question of the
reciprocally interacting nationalisms, both of which find a perfect foil
in the "Other" is part of the problem of the world today.
Maybe American rulers need Soviet communism and would need it
whether it existed or not. To say that American politicians need the
Soviet threat doesn't mean that there never has been and cannot be
such a threat. On the contrary, the reciprocal need of both parties to
project their hatred and fear on the Other, when this need is enforced
by the very material contrivances of respective military-industrial com-
plexes, is exactly the way to exacerbate the threat and bring it into
reality. It's a most menacing and most self-confirming process, and, as
we know, it is already assuming ritual forms beyond the control of the
actors. I just want to propose that the ultimate cause leading to World
War III is ideological, and that the ideological forces, and especially the
nationalist drives, in both superpowers, are in certain respects self-
engendered and proceed from domestic needs.
These last five years have been very curious. The ideological motors
of the cold war have been whining to a crescendo, but most of all in
the two superpowers which are most distant from each other. The allies
and clients who lie in between and whom one would suppose stand in
the immediate shadow of threat, have learned to lie snug abed o'nights.
East and West Germans amicably exchange spies and double-agents
with each other in rehearsed rituals and then get round the table to
explore new dimensions of trade. Europeans, East and West, show
signs of being more and more anxious at the gesticulations of their own
guardian superpower than at the menace of the other. What alarms
West Europeans now, and also I think many Canadians, is the sense
that the United States has become possessed with a new kind of super-
nationalism, very much like the European nationalisms of yesteryear,
but more gargantuan in its self-esteem and appetite, whose very fea-
tures are defined by anti-communism, a nationalism which pretends
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that it is the universal human destiny. The Soviet Union also has gen-
erated its own super-nationalism whose features are defined by anti-
Western imperialism, which also offers to engross a different human
destiny.
It is not easy to know which frightens us most. But in this year or
two, when a new generation of Soviet leaders are slipping into power,
who might at least be tested with genuine explorations in the making
of peace, it is perhaps the mistiming of American truculence which
alarms us most of all. We are worried, as I know that you are worried
also, by the nationalist urges that are caricatured in the phenomenon
of Rambo. When Mr. Weinberger attends conferences of NATO min-
isters, as if dressed up in combat fatigues and space-helmet and car-
rying an X-ray laser, like a messenger delivering a Rambogram, it's not
only the peace movements which scoot for shelter. President Mitterand
and Sir Geoffrey Howe dive under the nearest table, and Chancellor
Kohl, like the unhappy patrolman in Buffalo recently, shoots himself
in the foot.
The bipolarity of our world today seems to me to be the greatest of
our dangers. We need a plural, international community once more, a
polycentric diplomacy, or the furious mutual incitements of bipolar
otherness will destroy us all. That's why I favour a strategy of detaching
more and more nations from either superpower pole. It's in the inter-
ests of the people of both superpowers themselves. If there was a plural
world of non-aligned or only half-aligned states, then these might inter-
pose or mediate between these over-mighty Others. But it won't escape
your notice that I've pleaded, as a remedy for ~uper-nationalisms, the
regeneration of recalcitrant nationalisms in the zones between the Oth-
ers. Maybe the diversification and softening of otherness is the best that
we can hope for. But I have rather little hope. If civilized societies do
survive for more than two or three decades, it may not be through an
exercise of rationality, for reason itself now seems to have entered serv-
ice with the yahoos, but through the inextinguishable, human capacity
for laughter. For we really have now, with Star Wars, entered full stage
upon the theatre of the absurd.
LECTURE II. THE HEALING OF THE BLOCS
I WANT TO talk to you, perhaps in a more committed way, of my own
perspectives within the world peace movement. Yesterday, for at least
part of the time, I was aware that I was in a multidisciplinary univer-
sity, and we do as academics and as scholars have the duty to develop
these disciplines and these studies as a specific academic contribution.
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Nothing I say in this lecture is intended to steam-roller or to over-argue
the necessary exchange of minds and exchange of opinions.
Last night I was certainly not attempting to move out of the main
and central concern of peace movements with weaponry, with the arms
race, and with nuclear weaponry in particular. These are the real and
immediate dangers leading us to World War III. But they are also, at
the same time, a metaphor and a political symbol of the control of
client-states. It is now-if you read the expert journals of the defence
community-quite openly admitted that land-based cruise missiles,
which are by any exercise of worst-case hypotheses simply sitting-ducks
for counter-targeting (as opposed to seaborne cruise missiles, which are
being developed in thousands instead of in hundreds), were not nec-
essary and not even very important military instruments. But why the
Euro-missile crisis from 1980 to 1983 became so intense was because
the NATO military and political establishments were confronted by
peace movements and parties influenced by them, in what became a
tense internal domestic struggle; and it became necessary to put cruise
and Pershing down, and to test cruise in Canada, as a symbol of "the
unity of NATO"; and also as a symbol of United States hegemony-
military hegemony~ver its client NATO states.
This was instantly replied to in exactly the same vocabulary of sym-
bolism by the deployment of SS-2IS, 22S and 23S in territory which
hitherto, for the official record, had not had nuclear weapons placed
upon them: that is, in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. We understand,
from friendly and informal sources which increasingly are communi-
cating across the blocs, that some pressure, some arm-twisting, was
brought by the Soviet Union upon both Hungary and Bulgaria for the
reception of such missiles as well-but not Poland, they wouldn't dare
to put anything that the Poles could carry off on Polish soil. This was
resisted even by loyal Bulgaria on the grounds that they were in an
advanced state of negotiation with a NATO power, Greece, and also
with non-aligned Yugoslavia, with a view to developing a nuclear-free
Balkan zone; and resisted also by the Hungarians, who are managing
to side-step these issues and to become a mediating power in the centre
of Europe.
I was directing your attention to not the weapons so much as the
state of cold war out of which the weapons continually come, which
breeds the new generations of weaponry; and placing this at the top of
our agenda: not necessarily as the first campaigning issue but as the
issue to which all who wish to see a future for civilization must apply
their best thoughts and their best activity.
I ended by focusing on a prime issue, that of the mutually exacer-
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bating ideologies of nationalism in the Soviet Union and in the United
States. I indicated that we must find a polycentric or plural global
diplomacy. The existing bipolar structure is itself part of the problem,
and I would say it is unique in human history. It cannot be compared
to the confrontation even of Christendom and Islam; it is structured in
a quite different and quite formal way, this unique bipolar division of
the world with spheres of influence in the non-aligned world, right into
Latin America, Africa and Asia.
I don't wish to attempt a re-examination of the Causes through which
the cold war came about. At some time between 1947 and 1949, there
was the glaciation, an ice-age setting in, which developed like a giant
geological fault right across the centre of Europe and in other fissures
across the other continents, leaving this bipolar division. It was con-
tingency (unless one considers that there is some evil destiny) which
arranged that that moment when the meeting of the western Allies and
the Soviet armies came at the end of World War II should be exactly
the same moment as the atomic bomb was invented and then demon-
strated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the coincidence of the meet-
ing of those armies and the invention of the nuclear weapons which led
to this glaciation. One city in the heart of Europe, Berlin, became
bisected by a wall. And thereafter the normal processes of the intel-
lectual and social exchanges between societies and of the diplomatic
resolutions of problems were glaciated also.
There is thus an extraordinary history of stationary politics, of the
congealing into set forms of the societies on both sides of that geological
rift. Nuclear weapons in particular became a substitute for diplomacy
and for the human resolution of problems. In 1980 I proposed a ter-
minology for this in a rash essay which was partly addressed to those
over-theoretical Marxist friends of my previous years who wouldn't get
off their backsides and do anything about peace.5 I tried to cast the
problem in their framework of reference. I proposed the concept of
"exterminism" as a new concept to explain this unique historical
moment. I proposed that there was an inertial condition in which both
superpowers and both blocs were in a state of continual reciprocal rela-
tionship in which they were exacerbating their own tendencies towards
war: and that this brought with it the increasing allocation of resources
S "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization", New Left Review, no. 121
(May-June 1980): 3-31. Reprinted in my Beyond the Cold War: a New Approach to
the Arms Race and Nuclear Annihilation (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982). See also
"Exterminism Reviewed", in my The Heavy Dancers (London: Merlin Press, 1985);
the American edition (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985) omits this essay.
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and skills in both blocs towards militarization in such a way as to deter-
mine and to modify the structure of those societies themselves. They
were becoming, in the long term, more war-directed in their econ-
omies, in the priorities afforded to weaponry in those economies, in the
technologies favoured and fostered by those economies, in the ideolog-
ical formations fostered by this continual abrasion and confrontation
between the blocs, in their security controls and management of their
own citizenry and of their allies. These societies were becoming increas-
ingly shaped by what a historian can see as a long-term historical proc-
ess not willed by anyone but, as it were, self-reproducing and willing
its own end, which is a terminal nuclear war.
In this sense of war-directed societies, I offered the term "extermin-
ism". Alack, this argument, which was a tentative one, became in
translation, in some other languages, a finished and highly theorized
concept-Extenninismus, for example-and in the course of this trans-
lation there may have been a misunderstanding between the Hegelian,
or indeed the Cartesian, traditions of intellectual work, and the Bacon-
ian tradition out of which I come. What is seen as the evasiveness or
amateurism, or sometimes irresponsibility, of the English empirical tra-
dition of work-a tradition in which theory tends to appear either as
critique or as the formulation of hypotheses which are there for the
analysis and sorting of evidence but can then be reformulated-was
confused with a mode of thought in which this was an ideal paradigm
expressing precise reality; and thereby producing, contrary to my
intention, a pessimistic determinism. I discovered that "exterminism"
has been pronounced by Professor Thompson to be the terminus of
civilization, and that there is no possible way out of this inertial proces~.
Now it is true that my argument is determinist, in the sense in which
Shakespeare would have understood it, showing the "very form and
pressure of our time".6 This is the inertial direction in which our civ-
ilization tends. But it is not determinist in the absolute sense that no
alternatives exist, because the very contradictions of this process, out
of which the peace movement is one major phenomenon, may contra-
dict this. It is still open to the choices of women and men to deflect
this direction of civilization. Exterminism was a theoretical metaphor
which I used to bring to the sorting and analysis of an empirically
observable "deep process".
Not only some western thinkers, but some Soviet ideologists inter-
preted my meaning differently, and they read it as a doctrine of sym-
metry, or of equal responsibility. Although this doesn't belong
6 Hamlet, 1ll.ii.22-3.
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especially to my theory of determinism, I think I should quote a passage
from the European Nuclear Disarmament "Appeal", in which we said:
"We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military
leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both
parties have adopted menacing postures and have committed aggressive
actions in different parts of the world."7 This doesn't say that both
parties are exactly the same. It doesn't say that both parties are always
·equally awful in all ways. It says that both parties are awful at different
times and in different ways, and this is open to our examination. There
is a difference between symmetry and reciprocity. I never wished to
propose that these two blocs, in their ideology, in their economies, in
their domestic organization, were symmetrical partners or rivals in that
sense. Emphatically they are asymmetrical. They are asymmetrical in
geostrategic terms. The United States has a great deal of water all
around it. The Soviet Union is mostly land-locked, which is why the
Soviet Union's ICBMs are mostly land-based, whereas the United
States operates upon a triad.
They are also asymmetrical in crucial historical experiences and those
which bear upon the questions of peace and war. For the United States'
historical memory, major war-apart from their own civil war, which
was a heavy war-has always been "over there", whereas the Soviet
Union's historical memory is of 20,000,000 killed, of the scorched
earth, of the loss of all its major western industrial capacity and many
of its villages in World War II. The superpowers are emphatically dif-
ferent in social system and in degrees of blame and in moments in
which this blame existed. I accept the view that in general the United
States has had the leading edge in the technological development of
nuclear weapons and strategies from the beginning. There are one or
two exceptions, particularly in the Sputnik period in space. I think
there have been moments in which the Soviet Union has profoundly
screwed up the situation. One of the most severe actions against the
peace of Europe was the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
ending of the Prague Spring which itself might have been a healing
process in the continent and hence for the world.
But reciprocity is not the same as symmetry, and by "reciprocity of
relationship" I mean that their missiles bring forward our missiles,
which bring forward theirs. This continual reciprocity and interaction
happens in every field: the hawks of one side feed with morsels the
hawks of the other side and make them grow fat, and they fly back
with morsels to the other side. Even the doves of one side evoke
7 Protest and Survive (British ed.), p. 224.
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responses from the other. I am convinced that the western peace move-
ment's ideas have penetrated in many ways deeply into the Soviet bloc
and may even be showing responses in the flexible style which has come
with the new leadership in the Soviet Union. But in other ways, in the
minds of young people above all: the refraction of our activity reaches
through and is heard there. Communication on this much smaller, shri-
velled globe is closer than ever before. Thus in weaponry, in strategy,
in politics and also in ideology there is this mutual, reciprocal inter-
action and exacerbation. Both sides exist constantly within a common
bipolar field of force. And within this, the cold war can be seen as a
means of internal discipline and also of control and exercising hege-
mony over the rest of the world--control of clients directly, control
and influence of those outside direct clientage.
The cold war legitimates, in its ideology, quite old- fashioned impe-
rial exercises. It isn't the first time the United States has started playing
war-games in Nicaragua. They'd had that backyard long before there
were any commies about. But now, when they do the old imperial
thing, it's always justified in terms of moral leadership of the free world
and defence against communism and so on. Much the same is true of
the operation in Afghanistan, which is again in the name of defending
the socialist world. May I just say one thing about Afghanistan? I'm
sometimes told even by people in the peace movement that, after all,
these Afghans are terribly backward people, they are being funded and
helped by the enemies of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is
right to be helping the forces of modernization and progress. The his-
torical parallel that always hits me straightaway is that exactly the same
was said about Cromwell in Ireland in the 1640s. The Irish were a
backward, traditional people with an old, traditional faith. They were
illiterate. They were friends and allies of Spain and France. And Crom-
well was a modernizer, and he did represent, for the English, the forces
of progress. The trouble is the Irish people have never, after 300 years,
forgiven Cromwell. Nor will the Afghan people quickly forgive Brezh-
nev. So the cold war is used as a means of internal discipline. And at
times one glimpses queer moments of real complicity between the
antagonists, who are both antagonists and sometimes partners in having
a common desire to control and keep the world in order.
There is another perspective which we must always bear in mind if
we are concerned with peace. There are two kinds of peace which could
come out of this crisis, and both of them are preferable to nuclear war,
but they are very different. One of them is real peace. The other is
simply a "global Yalta", that is, just as Europe was once divided, so
the superpowers will sit down and decide to divide all the rest of the
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world up, as it already is partially divided up. The global Yalta is settled
above our heads. In looking for such a possible solution both super-
powers could act as partners or even as ideologicallookalikes.
Now, the European Nuclear Disarmament Committee and many of
its friends in the non-aligned movements in Europe are in most coun-
tries not affiliated to the World Peace Council (and indeed very firmly
not affiliated). They are non-aligned in their politics. By this I mean
the majority Norwegian movement ("No to Nuclear Weapons"), the
Icelandic movement ("Campaign against Military Bases"), the majority
Danish movement ("No to Nuclear Weapons"), the majority Dutch
movement (particularly the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, the
IKV), the more fissionated, the more divided multiple German move-
ments (the Social Democratic, the churches' movement, the women's
movements, the Greens). And the British movement (CND), the
majority Italian movement, the majority Spanish movement, and a sec-
tion of the Greek are non-aligned; a section of the Finnish is non-
aligned (not all of it); and in France there is a big split with the Mouve-
ment de la Paix being a World Peace Council affiliate and CODENE
non-aligned. So we are essentially talking about movements which by
theory and experience have come to adopt a non-aligned position,
which does not exclude meeting in bilateral or plural conferences with
the official peace councils of Eastern Europe. It doesn't exclude visiting
and exchanges of various kinds, but it does insist upon forming policies
independently and very watchfully.
A small influence in the development of this form may lie with the
END "Appeal" of 1980. This may help to explain why both that par-
ticular small committee (END) and I myself have received an aston-
ishingly bad press from both sides of the cold war. I have to read you
one or two of my press notices. In 1983 General Bernard Rogers, who
is the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, was giving evidence
before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services in
Washington, and he said a major argument against the freeze move-
ment in the United States "is the support that the freeze gives to those
movements in Western Europe that are counterproductive to our
efforts, because they look back and they say, 'Look at what's going on
in the United States, we've got support there.' It plays right into the
hands of a man named Thompson who heads the campaign." (Really,
if they think that I head the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in
the UK, it's very flattering, but if General Rogers's NATO intelligence
sources can't identify who heads CND, they aren't going to go very
far.) "A man named Thompson who has come out and said as much.
Just the fact that you're considering such a freeze, you see, plays into
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his hands."8 And at about the same time, Mr. Georgi Arbatov, the
Director of Moscow's Institute of United States and Canadian Studies,
was going round Holland and Belgium and referred to END and myself
as "affairs of the CIA". And this became even stronger in 1984 when
Mr. Yuri Zhukov, the President of the Soviet Peace Committee,
explained in one of their publications that, "having made a painful
reappraisal of the current situation, United States and NATO psycho-
logical warfare units are attempting to sabotage some of the anti-nuclear
movements from the inside, smuggling their own instructions and ideas
into them." And I'm singled out by Mr. Zhukov as the head of one of
these units.9 And Mr. Lokshin, the Secretary of the Soviet Peace Com-
mittee, adds the names to this of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foun-
dation, the British END Committee, Mr. Mient-Jan Faber, the General
Secretary of the Dutch Interchurch Peace Council, and for good meas-
ure the IPCC which is (sorry about our acronyms, the peace movement
is getting as bad as the war movement for acronyms) the International
Peace Communications and Coordination Centre, which is an office in
The Hague which brings together into regular conferences all these
non-aligned movements.
I'm only pointing out that Mr. Zhukov and Mr. Lokshin unmasked
a quite extraordinary conspiracy in which the most powerful European
peace movements turn out to be under the control of United States and
NATO psychological warfare units. Mr. Lokshin expains how this very
remarkable thing took place:
In NATO's arsenal and methods of subversion directed against the anti-war
movement, an ever greater place is being given to ideological warfare. This
is carried out partly with the help of various front organizations and groups
that insinuate themselves into the movement. E.P. Thompson, an English
historian and sociologist [not guilty], widely publicized oflate, a former pro-
fessor of Oxford University [not guilty], is the noisiest mouthpiece of these
anti-Soviet concerns.
And so on.
What is it that arouses the extraordinary anger of these official peace
diplomats? Well, Lokshin explains to his Soviet readers that Mient-Jan
8 Evidence before the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services given
on 25 April 1983.
9 Zhukov and Lokshin's articles are in International Life, June 1984. For more detail,
see my Double Exposure (London: Merlin Press, 1985; reprinted in the American edi-
tion of The Heavy Dancers).
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Faber of Holland and I are currently preoccupying ourselves with
attempts to "pull the anti-war movement into an authentic 'crusade'
against the socialist fraternity while cynically hiding themselves behind
stolen banners of peace. E. Thompson incites his listeners by saying,
'We have to begin acting as if a unified, neutral and peaceful Europe
already existed.'" What is actually being quoted here is a central phrase
of the END "Appeal" of April 198o-"We must commence to act as
if a united, mutual and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn
to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and we must
disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national
state. "10
Let's stand back from this for a moment and try to look back upon
our own times, this moment of history, from an imagined future. We
have to imagine that there is a future first. And there are three very
broad scenarios you can propose. One is that things go on grumbling
on as they are, or much as they are, for two or three more decades.
They will in that case be getting worse. The weapons will be getting
worse. They will have gone into a new dimension in space. The means
of security and control (including, I think, control over academic life)
will have increased on both sides, and probably we will then be in what
will be a determinist pressure towards the end: i.e. terminal nuclear
war. A second broad scenario is really, I think, a non-scenario,
although it's the one which is a fiction somehow in the back of people's
minds. If you ask them, "Here, how's it all going to end?", they say,
"Well, one side or the other is going to win the cold war." And I can
see no way in which the cold war can be won, given the present military
structures, without there being a nuclear war. Winning a nuclear war
in the sense of the victory of one side over the other is impossible. So
that we have to have a third scenario, and that is, very simply, that the
cold war goes away.
The cold war is not a permanent and absolute determined fixture of
national and international life. I think this is just one place where to
be sixty or so is an advantage over being twenty or so. We can still
remember a world-which was divided, yes, by ideologies, by nation-
alities, but not divided in the cold war way-in which there was still
an internationalism of a different sort; whereas people who are twenty
or thirty or forty have grown up habituated, as if this was part of the
very firmament, to a bipolar division of this sort. It is difficult for them
to imagine that this is a temporary and local moment in history which
could end.
10 Protest and Survive, p. 225.
Prom protest to survival 125
Looking to that future, I want to sketch an optimistic scenario-and
I am now addressing myself especially to the younger people in the
audience, because this is their scenario and, if it happens, it will be
because they, internationally, make this scenario. It is, I think, the only
scenario that they can possibly have. And it is not one scenario; it could
lead in very many directions, and the way it goes will depend upon
their internationalism and their ways of action. I would make a com-
parison with the end of European colonial empires after World War II.
I happened to grow up, to my good fortune, in an anti-imperialist fam-
ily. My father was a friend of the Indian Congress and worked for
Indian independence. I remember his exhaustion in the late 'thirties
when he came back from a round of meetings or day schools or what-
ever. One of the things he used to say was, "The mere mention of the
word 'India' is sufficient to empty the smallest hall in Oxford." The
limits of the possible had been reached. Yes, the Indian Congress was
now governing more and more provinces of India, but whenever you
came to the point of even dominion status, every kind of political
"impossibility" was presented as a barrier. And yet because of the
maturity and self-confidence of that extraordinary movement in India,
in 1945 it was impossible to refuse Indian independence. And maybe
to its credit, but perhaps because there was no alternative, a British
Labour Government consented to the inevitable without some terrible
Algerian or Indo-China war.
India opened the door. Immediately afterwards came Sri Lanka,
Burma, (not without some fighting) Malaysia, then (after terrible fight-
ing) French Indo-China, leading on of course to the second terrible
confrontation in Vietnam. Colonial Asia disappeared. Then, after some
episodes of war, including Kenya, with remarkable swiftness the entire
British Empire in Africa (apart from Zimbabwe, which was a white
colonial dominion) disappeared. By the early 'sixties Portuguese Africa
was an anachronism, which, of course, had consequences in a revolu-
tion in the metropolis itself in the end. All that process happened in
less than twenty years: the disappearance of what had seemed to be the
fixed world order in my parents' generation.
I'm saying the same kind of process could happen with the cold war.
It could melt like snow and give way to a different world, a more poly-
centric world. We could place upon the agenda as a realistic proposition
the demand that by the year 2000 or the year 2005 all Soviet bases and
troops should be withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe, and all
United States troops and bases should be withdrawn from Western
Europe; and that all troops, of the superpowers and of their allies,
should be withdrawn from any other territory whatsoever. This process
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would go along with the blurring of the edges of the two blocs.
Here again is where the choices of the younger generation will influ-
ence things. This need not always lead to nice solutions. It could lead
to the revival of some nationalisms that have been suppressed-the con-
frontation between Greece and Turkey, the confrontation (the Tran-
sylvanian question) between Hungary and Romania-all these national
issues could begin to rise again. Therefore the young people must be
carriers of a new kind of internationalism which will lead forward to a
new kind of internationalized world. If this future is even possible-
and I am arguing in directly contrary terms to all the defence com-
munity's mode of thought (which, as you know, is worst-case analy-
sis)-it can only be by best-case analysis, and then by working to bring
the best case about. That is the only way we can proceed. And if this
best case is possible, then we have to start to work for that future now,
systematically, actively, and also in professional and intellectual ways,
choosing already between the possible futures that will come if the cold
war melted away.
This is not only a possible future, but (which is a very different and
a much more hopeful thing to say to you) this future is already actually
present, now, as possibility; that is, the elements of this situation are
already to be found in the world today. They are to be found in the
standpoint, opinion, consciousness and some of the diplomacies of the
non-aligned world, which, with some of the now (I think) greatly mod-
ified policies of China (which could once again come back diplomati-
cally in some ways into the non-aligned world), represent the
overwhelming majority of the world's population and the overwhelm-
ing majority of the United Nations Assembly. It is already actually
present in the peace movement, and I don't mean only those who wear
badges and only those who belong to this or that chapter. I mean the
peace movement in the broadest sense of the concerned consciousness
of those who, in some way or other, are acting for peace. It's already
there in strategies for change which are being discussed in the books
and journals of the world; above all, in the sense that the script accord-
ing to which the statesmen of the embattled blocs are still acting out
their diplomacies and their military strategies is now a totally thread-
bare and outworn script that was first written in the 1940S and which
is now being rehearsed by rote, which no longer has life and authen-
ticity. It is an empty rhetoric, and the inheritors and executors of that
old cold· war script, the political and military elites who re-enact those
traumas, will either refuse to be dislodged from their positions of power
and, in that case, will bring down the roof of the world on our heads;
or they must give way.
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Alongside the actual potential presence of an alternative world among
us, are the changing realities which begin to give us purchase to find
those strategies. World War II ended with manifest United States'
hegemony over a whole part of the world, manifest economic domi-
nation accompanied by military superiority, with most of the nations
of Europe in a state of economic collapse or extreme stringency. Now,
of course, the scales have changed with the rise once again of productive
capacity in Japan, Western Germany and Western Europe generally.
The terms have shifted very perceptibly. United States' economic dom-
ination is now giving way to a weakening competitive position in some
areas in the world markets, which, of course, is provoking the demands
for protectionism and so forth. In a sense United States' hegemony is
now maintained by nuclear weapons and by military sinews because it
has lost some of the economic and political muscle. Whereas in the
Soviet bloc, I can remember a time in the 'fifties and 'sixties when we
used to think of Eastern Europe as being like a pea with six pods in it,
each of them the same and called a "people's democracy". The div-
ersification of Eastern and Central Europe is now quite extraordinary.
From that curious Mafia-run place Romania, where you have to register
the ownership of a typewriter like a handgun, but which nevertheless,
for particular national reasons, on occasion adopts diplomatic positions
critical of the Soviet Union, through loyal Bulgaria (which nevertheless
is beginning to show signs of independence), through Czechoslovakia,
which is essentially an occupied country (still occupied from 1968), to
Poland, which is Poland and nothing else can be said about it, to Hun-
gary, where there are all kinds of experiments in the diversification of
market socialism, small-scale enterprise, co-operatives and so on and
also in which there is (compared to the others) a degree of toleration,
of intellectual and cultural exchange, very little direct repression, and
more chances for travel. We now see quite a number of Hungarian
young people, some of whom are independent peace activists of the
Dialogue group, who come across to spend a couple of months in the
summer in Britain and go back. This is a quite new sort of situation,
and our young people go across there and immediately fall into dis-
course. It's amazing to think that this is a divided world.
Other signs and signals can be seen. There is this extraordinary busi-
ness of Marxism, which in the Soviet bloc has increasingly become sim-
ply an opportunistic, ritualized vocabulary into which you have to peer
with magnifying glasses to see what kind of underlying messages are
actually being read through it. And yet Marxism as a vital tradition has
fled to the West and the developing world, taking multiple heretical
forms and developing as a vital intellectual tradition, not in "actually
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existing" socialist states but in the developing world or in the western
world. Something of the same is happening to the rhetoric of traditional
liberalism, which has become outworn and sometimes hypocritical
rhetoric in the mouths of political elites in the West, but which has
intense vitality if you are an intellectual in KOS, working with Soli-
darnosc in Poland, or if you are a Czech intellectual within the circle
of the Charter 77 group.
I am convinced (one of the gains of travelling to nineteen or twenty
countries in the last five years in the peace movement) that there are
green shoots everywhere on both sides underneath the snows of the
cold war. The ideological double-bind which held the cold war together
used to be the "peace or freedom" double-bind. It was supposed that
if you were for peace in the West, then you must be pro-Soviet. I am
still accused of this constantly, I am sure some of you are. It's the old
double-bind that Bertrand Russell was very familiar with. No one
knows where the phrase "Better Red than Dead" came from, but it's
constantly being attributed to Russell. Yet Russell wrote in Unarmed
Victory that "Better Red than Dead" is "a slogan which has been fath-
ered upon me, although it is not Ininebut a translation of the slogan
of a hostile German journalist. I believe in the possibility of coexist-
ence."11 The peace movement throughout the world is increasingly
refusing the "peace or freedom" question and demanding both. In
exactly the same way this double-bind has worked in the Soviet bloc,
where every outspoken activist working for intellectual, religious, and
trade-union liberties, was typed as a friend of western imperialists or
as an agent of the CIA, was constricted and hemmed in as a "dissi-
dent". That was the block that prevented change taking place in the
communist world.
This, of course, was not just ideology-it was confirmed by insti-
tutions, some of which are still with us today, legacies again of the old
outworn script. Our problems with the Soviet Peace Committee and
the World Peace Council are precisely that these were formed in that
particular moment of the first cold war. They carryon those traditions;
and Mr. Zhukov, the President, is a man of seventy, deeply formed in
that kind of tradition; he was a Pravda journalist who apologized for
the Prague Spring in '68, and he comes from that combative Stalinist
tradition. Their attempt is simply the strategy of co-opting western
peace movements as pliant auxiliaries to Soviet diplomacy. These are
11 Unarmed Victory (Harmondsworth, Mddx.: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 9. (In searching
for this quotation a different explanation of the slogan turned up in Russell's Has Man
a Future? [Penguin, 1961], p. 90.)
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diplomatic sub-organs who handle western peace activists, host them
on conducted tours of an approved kind and also police citizen
exchanges so that we can't get through with direct citizen exchanges.
But we are now succeeding in doing it. These Stalinist survivors have
an absolute fury when genuine non-aligned movements appear. And on
the other side, the inheritors of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and
of the CIA operations are still very much at work. They're not just
imaginary fictions of Soviet ideology. Again and again, the efforts of
so-called "dissident" groups working for freedom in the Warsaw bloc
are screwed up because western agencies try and co-opt them, or try
and play them as cold war cards.
There are reasons why the attempt of western ideologists to use
"human rights" as their strong ideological card just won't play any-
more. I'll just indicate four of these readons. The first is manifest. I
don't have to tell this audience of the double standards involved. If you
want to know a place where the prisons are really full in Europe (and
full of peace activists among other people), then look at our loyal
NATO ally Turkey, funded heavily by the United States. The double
standards have a blind eye to El Salvador and can only see what's hap-
pening in Eastern Europe. That's manifest. Secondly, and of more
importance to those friends of ours who are trying to find their way on
the other side, is that it is at least a thrice-called bluff that the West is
anxious to aid them. This bluff brought no aid to the Hungarians in
1956, gave nothing to the Czechs in 1968 and wasn't very effective to
Poland's Solidarnosc. In fact the western cold warriors were calling
them out into an exposed position and then saying, "Well, bye-bye,
we hope you're lucky but we can't do any more." Thirdly, of course,
the rights that western cold warriors often champion (which are some-
times very good rights) they don't like quite so much at home. When
there are huge workers' movements which are proposing to take over
the self-management and control of the whole of society, they're mar-
vellous in Poland; but if they're air controllers in the United States or
if they're British Inineworkers, they get a quite different reception. So
that, fourthly, the even more painful recognition has developed in East-
ern Europe, amongst dissidents, that their main function for western
ideologists of the cold war is to suffer and to be seen to be suffering.
It's much much better if they are seen to be suffering-they are good
cards to play-than if they actually win, and gain certain of those
rights.
The peace movement has a totally different status. We have to be
concerned with civil and religious liberties, because they are part of the
necessary basis of building an international consciousness, and we can't
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have genuine citizen exchange unless these rights are extended and
established in every part of the world. But this is not a question of
linkage. It is not, "If you give these people rights, then we might con-
sider getting rid of a cruise missile." What the peace movement says
is: "We work for peace and freedom. There are no conditions. We work
for them together, we extend these demands together." And we are
never going to get any human rights of any kind at all over there from
a superpower on this side of the Atlantic with a Pershing II in one hand
and Nicaraguan blood on the other. On the contrary, that kind of pos-
ture is precisely what hardens and closes up the societies on the other
side. This is now becoming realized increasingly. It is precisely the cold
war heroics of the West which result in strengthening the hawks of the
East in resisting the due processes of modernization, which the citizens
on that side would get on with, in their own way, if we would only lean
back and stop pressing at them with military threats.
The most interesting example of this is Czechoslovakia. When we
'launched the END "Appeal" in the beginning of 1980, we had the idea
that this is surely an appeal to civil libertarians in the East. Let's try
the place with the oldest and longest relations with West Europe and
democratic traditions, Czechoslovakia. My wife and I went to Prague.
Every door around Charter 77 seemed to be shut. They wanted a boy-
cott on Soviet goods in protest about Afghanistan. Afghanistan
reminded them of 1968 in Prague. They had been told by someone
friendly to either the Soviet intelligence services or to the British intel-
ligence services, that I was a professor from the World Peace Council
trying to get them involved in a Soviet-inspired peace campaign. The
telephone was put down; the door wasn't answered. Since then there
have been four or five years of exchange and debate. And earlier in
1985, after a series of extremely positive messages and statements from
Charter 77 to the western peace movements, they came out with one
of the most striking and important documents in the entire global peace
movement. It is one which demands, precisely, an end to the cold war.
It demands the withdrawal of Soviet and of United States forces and
bases from the Continent. It demands the new kind of relationship
between a plural Europe and the developing world, which puts together
the cause of peace and freedom in a wholly constructive way and which
insists, also, that the peace movement and the civil rights movement
must be mature enough to ensure that this does not lead to destabilizing
processes which one or the other great power tries to take advantage
of. That is, we have to engineer a slope, which will lead us steadily,
and without destabilization, from the bipolar world of the cold war to
the polycentric world of the future.
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I still find the odd person in the peace movement who says, "Yes,
but aren't these dissidents? We don't want to talk to dissidents, do
we?" And I say, "Do you really know who these people in Charter 77
are? Can I just tell you about a few of these people?" There's Ladislav
Lis, who was a member of the Czech Communist Party under Dubcek.
When the Soviet tanks came into Prague, he convened, under the bar-
rels of the Soviet tanks' guns, an underground congress of the Czech
Communist Party protesting at the Soviet occupation. He' was then
jailed for four or five years, and was jailed again two years ago for a
year and a half, precisely because he was a spokesperson of Charter 77
and in communication with the western peace movement. There is
Jaroslav Sabata, now ill and about seventy, another former member of
the Central Committee of Dubcek's party, a psychologist who has
served seven years in prison since '68, in one case for distributing lea-
flets telling people they had the right to vote "no" in a general election,
on another occasion for meeting with Polish friends on the Czech-Polish
border. There's Jiri Hayek, who was foreign minister in Dubcek's gov-
ernment. There is Vaclav Havel, the well-known playwright. There are
Christian ministers, some of whom now tend boilers because they've
been prevented from their own ministry. These are serious people, peo-
ple with a lifetime, sometimes, of dedication to social and political or
religious causes. They are not to be written off as just "dissidents". Or
read George Konrad's recent book published in the West but, alas, not
yet published in Hungary (although he is a Budapest writer) Antipol-
iticsY It is an extraordinary voice coming to us from Central Europe,
asking for the reunification of our broken world.
This leads us to a strategy, much of which is already in hand in the
peace movements, of citizen exchange, maybe twinnings, maybe the
kind of example that professional groups (such as the International
Physicians) have already given us, of getting through sometimes to col-
leagues in our own professions; or with young people just putting a
rucksack on their backs and going there and finding out young people
to talk to. It leads to a political strategy in which we may build a second
tier of relations between West Europe and Canada, on the one hand,
and East and Central Europe on the other: diplomatic, trade, cultural
relations: a second tier between the superpowers, which would lead on
to a scenario of the "Finlandization" of Hungary or Poland and the
"Swedenization" of Holland or Britain or of Canada. That is, moving
into a grey area in between the black and white of the blocs.
The question of NATO seems to me to be an open option and one
12 Antipolitics, trans. Richard E. Allen (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1984).
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that we have to play by ear. In moving to strengthen the non-aligned
area, the stages by which we detach ourselves from each pole will have
to be determined by the state of play, politics, and public opinion at
the time. Some of our friends in the European peace movement point
out that it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that by 1990 we could
have a strong anti-nuclear majority amongst the NATO powers, and
that it might be possible to denuclearize NATO from within. Or if it
comes to that, the majority might have to expel the United States. (This
is proposed by some of our friends in Denmark and in Holland.) We
are talking about Germany, Britain, possibly Italy, Spain, Greece, Can-
ada, Holland, Norway, all adopting non-nuclear policies. That gives
rise to one option. On the other hand, there is the example of New
Zealand and Mr. Lange. Mr. Lange did not make great statements
about ANZUS. He just said, "I don't want your nuclear-armed war-
ships in my ports." The United States did all the rest. They educated
the New Zealand public.
If in Britain we should get a government-and the Labour Party is
completely pledged to this-which might send back cruise missiles, ask
the United States to remove its nuclear bases, and stop the British Tri-
dent, that will commence a real educational process. The response of
the U.S. military will be sharp, and we're going to need the help and
understanding of friends in the United States, in Canada, and in the
peace movement in Western Europe. But if this should happen, I
believe a peace-minded government must have an active eastwards-
looking politic as well. If United States' bases and nuclear weapons
were going to be removed from a NATO nation, that government
should also say, "Come on, we want to see them out of Czechoslovakia,
too." If we're going to have American troops out of Holland or out of
Britain, what about remembering that Soviet troops only came in "tem-
porarily" in '68 to Czechoslovakia? Because, believe me, the Dutch
people or the British people might screw themselves up to the point of
doing that, but they won't hold that position unless they see some
response coming from the other side. This is real politics that we will
be into.
There are many other intermediate strategies that many of you must
have thought about. I haven't said anything about nuclear-free zones,
a nuclear-free Pacific, Indian Ocean, the Atlantic itself, zones of peace
in Central Europe; I've said nothing about the problem of the two Ger-
manies-all these are the intermediate strategies which are becoming
real and which, I am convinced, anyone here who is forty will live to
see coming into the remit of practical politics within ten or twenty
years, providing we can prevent nuclear war. This is the way out of
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our dilemma. I've said nothing about the reactivation of the United
Nations in this perspective.
There are two final points. The first is the question of destabilization.
When your hand is frozen, it's very painful when it thaws out. And
when a whole geopolitical system has been frozen for forty years, the
thaw is going to be painful. There will be immaturities. There will be
huge movements like Solidarnosc which can't find their way interna-
tionally, however mature they are internally. (Solidarnosc was mature
in its refusal of violence inside Poland; I think it didn't know where it
was in the international world.) There is going to be a very choppy
period, rapids and cross-currents, that will come in your time. That's
why you have to start thinking about them now. That's why you have
to be beginning to chart courses. That's why you have to begin to make
choices now, in advance of those emergencies beginning to arise. That
is why we have to be mature as peace movements. And that is why we
must expose anyone, from either side, who is an agent of the arms
systems, who tries to exploit this situation to the advantage of their
own side. These are the people who are even more dangerous than the
makers of nuclear weapons.
And the final thing is, the people have to go ahead of the states. The
armed states cannot get out of this situation. Their very raison d'etre
consists in being armed. So the people have to go ahead of the states
and make a channel through which politics may later flow. And in this
sense, intellectuals and scholars have to consider themselves to be state-
less persons. We act in the interests of no armed state. We must help
because our skills and privileges allow us to serve as communicators.
We must open up those channels through which the currents of politics
may flow to the possible future.
Upper Wick, Worcester
